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Abstract : 
 
The Russian gas sector is undergoing significant changes which is opening the way for an 
original reform. Because of the particular institutional and economic context of the country, 
this reorganisation is not taking place along the lines of the de-integrated model of the EU. It 
is characterised by increasingly significant competitive fringes. Gazprom remains the main 
actor of the Russian gas industry but the company is facing challenges on its main export 
market and an increasing competition at home with the arrival of new gas firms, independents 
and Russian oil companies. For Gazprom, the aim issue is to develop more flexible strategies 
for export markets but also on its internal market. These internal changes will not be without 
consequence on the country’s export strategy and the implication for international markets 
could be considerable.  
 
 
JEL : P28, Q34, L23 
Russia, reform of the gas organisational model, institutional analysis 
 
The decline in Russia’s gas exports to the EU in 2012 – with Norway, its main competitor, 
benefiting from this drop – suggests that all might not be well with the Russian “gas model”. 
As the European gas market becomes increasingly competitive and characterised by 
significant surpluses, debate is now focussed on the capacity of Gazprom, which controls all 
Russian natural gas exports, to adapt to the current changes by developing more flexible 
policies. Under particular scrutiny is Gazprom’s insistence on defending its export prices to 
the detriment of export volumes, a strategy that has led to a drop in its market share. 
However, Gazprom’s export strategy and any changes that might be made cannot be 
examined in isolation from its domestic market, particularly where profitability is concerned. 
The economic and institutional context in which the gas company operates is changing 
dramatically under the combined effect of three main developments, and this could affect the 
behaviour of Gazprom. Increases in domestic prices have resulted in significant 
improvements in profitability, giving the company the possibility of creating new export 
strategies. As well as facing challenges on its main export market, Gazprom is also facing 
increasing competition at home with the arrival of new gas firms, independents and Russian 
oil companies. At the same time its production costs are rising as it develops gas fields in new 
areas to replace the maturing fields that were developed under the former Soviet Union. 
Russia’s export strategy and its domestic reforms are inextricably linked.  
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The Russian gas sector is undergoing significant changes that are opening the way for an 
original reform whose blueprint is now becoming apparent. The “Gazprom model” resulting 
from the reforms that took place in the 1990s endorsed a hierarchical governance structure 
based on a quasi-monopoly in the production segment, and a transmission and export 
monopoly. This governance structure has been and remains to a certain degree compatible 
with the country’s institutional environment. According to the concept of institutional 
complementarity developed by the Neo-institutional Economy (NEI), the functioning of an 
institution is conditioned by interactions with other institutions (Höpner, 2005). From the 
point of view of the NEI, a structure based on de-integration of the gas industry and complete 
unbundling of Gazprom, as envisaged in the 2000-2002 reform projects, had little credibility. 
However, the present structure is not incompatible with changes characterised by increasingly 
significant competitive fringes. The reform of the gas industry is focussed on developing 
competitive forms that will enable new players to gradually contest Gazprom’s market power. 
This competition is emerging as an essential institution of the reform. Its purpose is two-fold. 
First, it acts in a fairly conventional manner to help discipline Gazprom’s behaviour. Second, 
the presence of competitors enables the State to reduce information asymmetry in its relations 
with Gazprom, which has long been seen as a State within the State. From this point of view, 
the competition between the two main State companies, Rosneft and Gazprom, is a specificity 
of the Russian reform. The consequences for international markets could be considerable. 
 
Our aim here is to identify the characteristics of the Russian gas market, which revolves 
around Gazprom, and the emergence of a dual market. We shall then seek to show how 
changes in the European and Russian gas markets are forcing Gazprom to modify its 
behaviour and strategies and are thus likely to provide the basis for reform and for a gas 
industry specific to Russia. 
 
I - Hierarchical governance structure  
 
The reforms of the 1990s left the Russian gas sector with a hierarchical type of governance 
structure. A governance structure can be described as a hierarchy of economic institutions, 
the “explicit or implicit contractual framework governing a transaction” (Williamson 2005). 
Neo-institutional theory defines institutions as “the rules of the game of a society (…), the 
constraints (…) that structure human interactions” (North 1990)1. The Russian gas structure 
governance is characterised by the presence of the financial holding Gazprom, which had a 
quasi-monopoly over production as well as full control over transmission (gas pipelines) and 
exports to Europe. By the 2000s, Gazprom had control over all exports, including potential 
exports to Asia. The gas sector is thus characterised by hierarchical (non-contractual) 
coordination mechanisms and public property rights The State held a 38% share in the 
holding, making it a dominant – yet not majority – shareholder. It was only at the beginning 
of the 2000s that the State became Gazprom’s major shareholder, with a 51% stake. Even so, 
this type of model does not exclude the possibility of the development of competitive fringes, 
and in the 2000s this led to the gradual emergence of a dual gas market.  
 
1.1 The debate between the advocates of centralisation and those of liberalisation 
 
                                                          
1 They consist of formal rules (rules, laws, constitutions) and informal constraints (norms of behaviour, 
conventions and codes of conduct, North 1990). Rules restrict behaviour but they can also facilitate coordinated 
action among decentralised players operating in an environment characterised by endogenous uncertainty 
(Rossiaud 2012). 
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The idea of introducing a liberal governance structure such as that tried out in the oil sector 
(Rossiaud 2012) was the subject of recurrent debate throughout the 1990s, as can be seen 
from the various reform proposals. These proposals aimed at introducing a reform of the 
sector based on the de-integrated competitive model tested by the EU through the 1998 and 
2003 directives. Proposed restructuring was thus centered on the vertical de-integration of 
Gazprom. The idea was to separate production and transmission activities (according to a 
logic of ownership unbundling) in order to separate the competitive segments of the market 
from the activities of natural monopolies. In keeping with a competitive approach, the aim 
was also to create six producers from the production firms owned 100% by Gazprom. The 
company would keep the ownership over the transmission system which as a natural 
monopoly would be regulated by the State with third party access (TPA). Gazprom would 
also maintain its function as the sole gas exporter, the only concession in relation to the 
European model. In a final stage (2007-2013), Gazprom would be limited to export activities 
only. The position of the “reformers” was less clear-cut where liberalisation of gas exports 
was concerned (in particular exports to Europe), this question not being one of their priorities 
(Locatelli 2003). However, the feasibility and credibility of a reform based on the de-
integrated competitive model of the EU were called into question by the economic and 
institutional environment of Russia. Two institutional forms are particularly problematic, 
namely property rights and, in particular, the mechanism for coordination through monetary 
relations and prices. 
 
- Alignment of a hierarchical governance structure with Russia’s institutional 
environment 
 
Governance structures can only be examined in the context of the institutional environment 
(as defined by North) in which they operate (Williamson 2000, Dixit 2009). Consequently the 
governance structure must be aligned with the institutional environment2. From this point of 
view, the “Gazprom model” is the organisational and institutional form that enables non-
monetary relations and low energy prices to be best managed. The fact that gas industry 
regulatory measures have focussed on quantities, with little concern for profitability criteria, 
costs or prices, has meant that the Russian economy has had access to an inexpensive stable 
supply of gas, despite the insolvency of a large number of industrial and domestic consumers 
as well as some distributors. This supply has ensured the continued operation of industry, gas 
being one of the main inputs for electricity generation. Numerous authors have highlighted 
the special role played by Gazprom in the Russian economy (Gaddy and Ickes 1997 1998 
1999, Woodruff 1999). 
 
The gas sector has been managed by regulating quantities through the mechanism of delivery 
quotas. Gazprom negotiates these quotas with the main categories of consumers at 
administered prices set by the State (Ahrend and Tompson 2004). While the problem of non-
payment disappeared in the 2000s, the system of low energy prices has prevented any kind of 
competition, for at least two reasons. First, the price structure takes into account substantial 
cross-subsidies between the industrial sector and the residential sector, the latter being 
subsidised by the former. Second, it can be estimated that at least until the early 2000s 
domestic prices were on average lower than Gazprom’s marginal production cost (Tarr and 
Thomson 2003, Dubek et al. 2006) thus limiting the profitability of gas sector operators. In 
2001, the price of gas for residential consumers was $10/1000 m3 while for industry it was 15 
to $16/1000 m3, compared with an average of $120/1000 m3 for gas exported to Western 
                                                          
2 For a more detailed analysis see Locatelli and Rossiaud (2013). 
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Europe. Privileged access to revenues from its exports to the European market has helped 
Gazprom finance its investments. In return for obtaining revenues in foreign currency, 
Gazprom must commit itself to fulfilling long-term take-or-pay (TOP) contracts with its 
European clients. From this point of view it is undoubtedly Gazprom’s hierarchical 
governance structure that has enabled it to honour its contracts with its European clients and 
guarantee the stability of Russian supplies.  
 
The “Gazprom model” also addresses the issue of uncertainty over property rights which was 
one of the main problem in the Russian oil sector (Rossiaud and Locatelli, 2009). Relations 
between the financial holding and its companies are dominated by a special coordination 
mechanism known as internal transfer prices. These are the prices at which Gazprom 
purchases gas from the production companies through Transgaz. These prices are generally 
set lower than gas production costs (Kryukov and Moe 1996). This means that the production 
companies operate at a deficit, which gives them considerably less autonomy. Through this 
mechanism, Gazprom is able to keep the financing of its investments centralised (Locatelli 
2003). 
 
1.2 Development of a competitive fringe through a “dual market” for natural gas  
 
The hierarchical governance structure is consistent with the emergence of competitive fringes 
in specific segments of the Russian gas market. Gazprom has in fact never had a complete 
monopoly over exploration and production. It holds only 70% of the country’s proven gas 
reserves, which at the end of 2010 amounted to 19 trillion cubic metres (Gazprom 2013). Two 
other categories of players can be identified alongside Gazprom. In the first category are the 
independent producers, which are generally private companies that received some of the 
exploration and production licences at the time of the gas sector reform in 1992. Itera, 
Northgaz and Novatek fall into this category. The second category is the Russian oil 
companies. These companies have oil fields with associated gas production or simply hold 
gas exploitation licences and therefore have a significant role in the gas production sector3. 
These two types of independents now account for a non-negligible part of Russian gas 
production, with 27% in 2012 compared with 6% in 1996 (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Russian gas production by producer  
 
Gm
3
 1996 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2012 2013 
forecast 
Gazprom 564.7 556.0 548.6 549.7 462.2 506.6 509.8 479 496 
Other 
producers 
38.3 100.2 104.1 113.9 120.2 141.7 160.7 176  
Total 603 656.2 652.7 663.6 582.4 650.3 670.5 655  
Sources: Gazprom, Russian Energy Ministry 
 
These players have developed their growing role in the particular context of a dual market, 
with regulated prices on the one hand and free market prices on the other (Ahrend and 
Tompson 2004). Households are supplied with gas from the regulated market at prices 
governed by the Federal Tariff Service4. Wholesale prices are determined on the basis of 
                                                          
3 Some of the gas fields concerned are very large, such as the Kovytka field initially held by Rusia Petroleum 
before being taken over by Gazprom. 
 
4 The following legal provisions allow the State to regulate gas prices: 
- Law of 1995 on natural monopolies 
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geographical areas. Gazprom is the only supplier on this market. Industrial consumers (and 
particularly the electricity sector) are also supplied by this market but according to quotas 
negotiated with Gazprom. Consumers may purchase gas in addition to their negotiated 
quantities on a so-called free market at unregulated prices. This market is supplied for the 
most part by independent gas producers and Russian oil companies. Gazprom also supplies 
this market but to a lesser degree, more specifically to sell its “new gas”5. 
 
 
Box 1: Non-regulated gas market 
 
The non-regulated gas market comprises: 
 
– sales by independent producers and Russian oil companies at freely negotiated prices. In 2007, free 
prices were between 10 and 20% higher than negotiated prices. This price difference is gradually 
disappearing.  
 
– sales by Gazprom on the Russian Gas Exchange (spot market), created by the decree of 2006. 
According to this decree, Gazprom, through its subsidiary Mezhregiongaz, could sell 5 Gm3  of gas at 
free prices provided that the same amount (5 Gm3) was sold by independent suppliers on this same 
market. The underlying rationale was that Gazprom’s sales should not exceed sales by third parties. In 
2006-2007 and 2008 sales on this Exchange increased significantly, providing increasingly credible 
information about market prices. The crisis at the end of 2008 prevented the further development of 
this Exchange but its creation represented a willingness on the part of the public authorities to create a 
more permanent platform for trade. 
 
– 2007: decree enabling “new gas” (gas from newly exploited fields), more specifically operated by 
Gazprom, to be sold at free prices. An implicit result of this rule was that the volume of gas sold by 
Gazprom at regulated prices should not exceed 300 Gm3. Beyond this limit, consumers would have to 
buy gas at unregulated prices from Gazprom, independents or Russian oil companies (Henderson 
2012).  
 
In all, Gazprom accounts for 25% of gas sales on the unregulated market (equivalent to over 
100 Gm3). 
 
This institutional mechanism has been and continues to be an important means for ensuring 
flexibility in the Russian gas market, and for Gazprom it is a key factor in its production 
strategy, and even in its export strategy. Depending on the requirements of the market, 
Gazprom, with its monopoly over transmission, has been able to accept or refuse to deliver 
gas produced by independents and in so doing to control supply on the market. An additional 
advantage is that this mechanism has enabled Gazprom to meet its contractual commitments 
with European countries at times when there has been pressure on production. 
 
II – Challenges to the “Gazprom model”: directions for Russian reform  
 
The so-called Gazprom model is now being called into question as a result of developments in 
the European gas market as well as the changes taking place in Russia’s domestic market. 
Greater competition is emerging as an essential element in the Russian gas sector reform with 
two goals. The first is a relatively conventional goal of improving efficiency essentially 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
- Law of 1999 on gas supply in the Russian Federation  
- 1995 directive on gas prices, amended in 1997, 2000 and 2010. 
 
5 New gas is from the development of new fields and involves considerably higher production costs than those 
for reserves developed in the 1970s (Urengoy, Yamburg…). 
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through ensuring greater discipline in Gazprom’s behaviour. Second, the State must be able to 
reduce information asymmetry in its relations with Gazprom, which has often been referred to 
as a state-within-a-state (Nemtsov and Milov 2008). With the arrival of competitors the State 
is thus attempting to obtain a certain amount of essential information, particularly regarding 
production costs, pricing and taxation levels that enable companies to be profitable.  
 
2.1 Changes taking place in Gazprom’s main export market, the EU 
 
Developments in the gas market in Europe, which is Gazprom’s principal export zone, mean 
that Gazprom will have to adapt its strategy to a new context. Two factors, both related to a 
more competitive environment, pose problems with regard to the company’s policy. First, 
Gazprom must adapt to the situation of a gas surplus on the market, brought about by the 
economic crisis, and the accompanying fall in demand, but also by the development of shale 
gas in the US6. Second, the company must find a way to deal with the EU’s desire to create a 
competitive and integrated European gas market (directives of 1998, 2003, 3rd energy package 
of 2009). Gazprom must find way to of dealing with these developments by introducing more 
flexibility into its trade relation and in particular in its contracts with purchasers. Challenges 
are being made to certain clauses in long-term TOP contracts, which have always played an 
essential role in Europe’s gas supply. The debate is focussed more specifically on the price 
indexation formula in the contracts. The EU market is characterised by two rationales for the 
formation of natural gas prices: one based on spot markets where the price results from the 
confrontation of supply and demand; the other on long-term contracts in which prices have 
traditionally been indexed to those of crude oil or refined products. In practice the two 
systems are not totally separate, though since 2008 gas prices in long-term contracts and on 
spot markets have been subject to substantial decoupling. The prices of natural gas and LNG 
on European spot markets have plummeted due to the over-abundance of gas caused by the 
economic crisis. At the same time, prices in TOP contracts have kept pace with the rising 
trend in refined-product and crude prices. Because of this decoupling of prices, a great many 
of Gazprom’s clients prefer to purchase gas on spot markets and have asked Gazprom to 
revise its pricing formula in long-term contracts.  
 
- Are changes afoot in price-volume trade-offs in Gazprom’s strategy? 
 
The company remains intent on maintaining a price indexation formula linking gas prices to 
those of oil. But Gazprom has lost a large market share. In 2012 its gas exports to Europe fell 
by 5.5% while Norway saw a rise in its export volumes7. This drop in the company’s sales to 
Europe can be blamed on its strategy of defending prices to the detriment of volumes. On 
average the selling price of Russian gas to Europe was $402/1000 m3 (that is a rise of 5%)8. 
Price-volume trade-offs are a reality for all gas producers. The question is whether Gazprom’s 
loss of market shares will prompt it to agree to a certain degree of flexibility in long-term 
contract prices so as to adapt to the changing conditions in the European market. It is difficult 
                                                          
6 With the development of shale gas, the US has become self-sufficient as regards gas. A considerable volume of 
LNG originally destined for the US first ended up in Europe and subsequently in Asia. 
 
7 Gazprom’s exports to Europe (excluding the Baltic states) amounted in 2012 to 138.8 Gm3 (the same level as in 
2010) compared with 150 Gm3 in 2011, with Germany and Italy remaining its biggest customers (Gazprom 
Export, 2013). Since 2005, apart from in 2010 and 2012, gas exports to this zone have always exceeded 150 
Gm3. 
 
8 “Gazprom’s export slide in 2012”. International Gas report, n° 718, 25 Feb. 2013. 
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to know whether the company is prepared to change its strategy. But a few points are worth 
looking at more closely.  
 
First, Gazprom has attempted to maintain a certain level of competitiveness in relation to spot 
prices for natural gas by agreeing to negotiate lower prices in its long-term contracts with its 
principal clients, but seemingly without fundamentally changing the price indexation formula. 
In 2012 the company paid a total of $2.7 billion to the European gas companies concerned, 
and this could rise to $4.7 billion for 20139. But Gazprom seems to be strongly opposed to 
changing its basic formula by taking spot prices into account, as the Norwegians have done 
and as recommended by a certain number of authors (Stern 2009b, Stern and Rogers 2011)10. 
Problems over the reliability of spot prices along with the question of the hub marker price11 
are frequently used as justification by Gazprom for refusing to make changes. Spot prices do 
not reflect gas market conditions (and cannot therefore be used as marker prices), particularly 
because of the lack of liquidity and depth of the gas hubs. Furthermore, a large proportion of 
the gas supplied to the EU is traded according to another price formation system in long-term 
TOP contracts (Komlev 2013). 
 
It is important to note that despite its loss of market share in Europe, Gazprom’s profit 
margins are much greater than they were at the end of the 1990s. In fact, Gazprom is in a 
position to maintain its prices given that the profitability of its domestic market has improved 
thanks to a rise in government-regulated prices. Any analysis of the company’s export policy 
must take into account changes in the domestic market. It is important to remember that this 
market accounts for a large proportion of the company’s gas sales (around 300 Gm3). From 
this point of view, Gazprom can decide upon new balances and trade-offs between its three 
main markets, namely Russia, the EU and the CIS countries. In the longer term, Asia will 
probably also be part of this equation. 
 
Second, the questions of long-term contracts and the price indexation formula are directly 
linked to the company’s need to finance the development of new fields where conditions 
make production costs much higher (Yamal, Barents Sea, Eastern Siberia). Some pressure has 
been taken off this question at least in the short-to-medium term because of the changes in the 
European market. There is no longer any justification for a strategy of maximising production, 
as can be seen from Gazprom’s adjustments to its production objectives. Some investments 
can be put on hold. But in the long term, the company must make huge investments – which 
carry inherent risks – and therefore needs to have guaranteed outlets on the European 
markets12.  
 
                                                          
9 These companies are E.ON-Rurhgas (Germany), PGNiG (Poland), DONG (Denmark), ENI (Italy) and Econgas 
(Austria). 
 
10 On this point, the reader may refer to the debate between S. Komlev, Contract Structuring and Pricing 
Directorate of Gazprom Export, and J. Stern and H. Rogers, Oxford Institute of Energy Studies (Komlev 2013, 
Stern and Rogers 2013).  
 
11 For a spot price fixed at a hub to become a marker price, the hub must offer, among other attributes, the 
necessary depth, liquidity and transparency, and consequently be able to attract a significant number of market 
players (Heather 2012). 
12 Low domestic gas prices are currently not sufficient to provide a return on the investments needed to develop 
the gas province. 
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Finally, it is important to point out that gas trading relations between Russia and certain EU 
countries cannot today be reduced to the logics of long-term contracts versus spot markets. 
There is evidence of more structural changes. Gazprom’s strategy to gain footholds 
downstream in the European market (Locatelli 2008, 2012) with asset swapping as a key 
mechanism, as in the latest agreement (2012) between BASF and Gazprom13, is a prelude to 
new types of trading. Clearly for the time being such strategies remain on the sidelines and are 
contrary to the policy of increased competition promoted by the EU, which strongly opposes 
them on the grounds of the principle of ownership unbundling and the third-country clause in 
the 3rd energy package of 2009. But they cannot be ignored when they concern and are 
implemented by Gazprom’s main customer, Germany, and are a priority for Russia and its gas 
company.  
 
In consequence, with greater flexibility in its investment strategy and improved profitability 
on its domestic market, Gazprom may find it more in its interest to sell periodically on spot 
markets when prices are high and so have more flexibility with regard to its contract sales. 
But it is important that the company does not allow spot sales to pose a challenge to its 
contracted sales by selling excessively large volumes on these markets.  
 
 
2.2 Competition for Gazprom on its domestic market: ways for reform 
 
The “Gazprom model” is also being called into question because of the emergence of an 
increasingly competitive domestic market. This competition is between Gazprom and the gas 
companies like Novatek but also between the two State companies Gazprom and Rosneft (the 
State oil company). This is a very specific characteristic of the Russian hydrocarbon sector.  
 
Three rationales add credibility to the development of a competitive approach in Russia. First, 
the rationale of dual markets and the gradual rise in government-regulated gas prices means 
that Gazprom is having to compete more and more with independent producers and Russian 
oil companies in significant segments of its market, namely the industrial and electric power 
sectors. Between 2006 and 2010, prices rose by 124% for the industrial sector and 121% for 
the residential sector (cf. Table 2). The initial reform project (parity with European prices 
from 2011 for the industrial sector and from 2013 for the residential sector) seems to have 
been shelved for the time being, or at least delayed. In the absence of a world gas market there 
might seem to be little economic justification for such reform14 (Tarr and Thomson 2003).  
 
Table 2: Average regulated prices for natural gas in Russia 2006-2011 
Forecasts for 2012 and 2013 
 
By 
thousand 
m3 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011  2012 
(2) 
2013 
(2) 
Industries  Roubles 1104 1352 1690 1957 2478 2583 - - 
                                                          
13 Wintershall, a subsidiary of BASF and a partner of Gazprom in the Wingas joint venture, has signed a basic 
agreement for a deal to acquire stakes in the development of the Urengoy field. In exchange, Gazprom will 
obtain a share in BASF (through Wintershall) in the WIEH, WIEE and Wingas joint ventures, and will become 
the sole owner of these projects. These are companies that market Russian gas in Europe, particularly in 
Germany and Austria.  
 
14
 In the absence of a world natural gas market and given Gazprom’s dominant position on the Russian market, 
the domestic price must be one that enables producers to cover their long-run marginal cost (Tarr and Thomson 
2003). 
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(1) 
 Dollars 40.58 52.81 67.87 64.80 82.60 91 (2) 105 119 
Households Roubles 863 1031 1291 1294 1903    
 Dollars 31.72 40.27 51.85 49.47 63.43    
(1)  For the first 6 months of 2011 
(2)   Forecasts of the Russian Federal Tariff Service  
Sources: Price rises and market reform in Russia, a long and winding road. Gas matters, June 2011; Gazprom 
Financial report 2011, Gazprom 2012; Dynamics of gas wholesale prices for industrial consumers. Russian 
Federal Tariff Service. 
 
Nevertheless current price rises seem to be sufficient on the one hand to ensure Gazprom’s 
profitability and on the other to keep regulated prices in line with free prices on the 
unregulated market (Henderson 2013). At least this is the assumption that can be made in 
light of the contracts drawn up between certain independents and important players in the 
electric power and industrial sectors to supply gas volumes that were previously supplied by 
Gazprom (cf. Table 3). They can now offer gas at prices that are competitive with Gazprom’s. 
If this trend continues it could be a step towards unification of the markets. 
 
Aside from the role of prices, competition between Gazprom and other gas industry players is 
also made possible through stricter application of rules regarding access to Gazprom’s 
transmission network. Since the gas pipeline system is a natural monopoly, third party access 
(TPA) to the network is a necessary condition for introducing competition to the sector. TPA 
in fact requires that freely available and non-discriminatory access to the gas transmission 
network be given to all producers. This provision has been in place in Russia since 1997 but 
has hardly been enforced. It has generally been left to the goodwill of Gazprom, which alone 
has information on the rate of use of pipeline capacity. This situation now seems to be 
changing, the Federal Antimonopoly Service having brought Gazprom before the courts 
several times in recent years for abusing market dominance. 
 
Table 3: Main gas contracts between independents and oil companies and customers in the 
Russian industrial and electric power sector, 2009-2012 
 
Seller Buyer Volume (bcm) Duration (yrs) Date 
Novatek Inter RAO 7.7 6 November 2009 
Novatek OGK-1 57 6 November 2009 
Novatek MMK 50 10 June 2012 
Lukoil E.On Russia 2.24 10 June 2012 
Novatek Mechel 17 11.5 July 2012 
Novatek E.On Russia 150 15 August 2012 
Novatek Fortum 30 15 August 2012 
Novatek Uralchem 8 5 September 2012 
Rosneft E.On Russia 23 3 September 2012 
Surneftegaz E.On Russia na 3 September 2012 
Novatek Severstal 12 5 October 2012 
Rosneft Inter RAO 875 25 November 2012 
Novatek Mosenergo 27 3 December 2012 
TNK-BP TGK-5 15 (estimate) 17 December 2012 
TNK-BP TGK-7 20 (estimate) 15 December 2012 
TNK-BP TGK-9 20 (estimate) 17 December 2012 
Source: Henderson  (2013) 
 
Finally, with demand continuing to stagnate both at home and on the export market (Stern 
2009a), the present Russian gas surplus is likely to persist given the forecast production 
growth figures announced by the independents and oil companies. J. Henderson (2013) has 
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shown that independents and oil companies have the means to potentially produce 350 Gm3 
by 2020. And these companies (in particular Rosneft) have a priority: monetizing their natural 
gas resources. This suggests that the market will become increasingly competitive.  
 
- Competition and reduced information asymmetry  
 
The development of competition can induce profound structural changes in the Russian gas 
market from two main points. First, competition helps reduce information asymmetry between 
the state and Gazprom. Indirectly, it can reveal certain information about the profit levels of 
the various players and thus their production costs. It is undoubtedly difficult for the state to 
obtain such information simply by regulating Gazprom, given that it is a major player in the 
economy. The private sector could thus be used for benchmarking, especially for decisions 
concerning reform of gas prices and taxes.  
 
Second, the presence of competitors will oblige Gazprom to take a closer look at some of its 
strategies and to improve efficiency in order to remain competitive. Studies on Gazprom are 
very limited, but they emphasise three main problems that critics of the company use to 
support their claims of Gazprom’s inefficiency: problems of Corporate Governance, agency 
problems (Gazprom often being referred to as a state-within-a-state, Nemtsov and Milov 
2008)15, and the company’s poor economic performance. With respect to this performance, 
these studies draw attention to the fact that dividends on Gazprom shares are lower than those 
paid by private Russian oil companies. They mention the problem of overemployment16 and 
the company’s high production costs. Furthermore, authors have drawn attention to the 
deterioration in the company’s financial situation in the 2000s, with debt levels increasing by 
60% between 2005 and 2010 (Wood Mackenzie 2004, Victor 2008, Victor and Sayfer 2011). 
But it is extremely difficult to determine how much blame can be attributed to low gas prices 
and how much to poor management. Since 2008, Gazprom has seen an upward trend in net 
profits. Despite a drop in the volume of gas sold on its domestic market between 2008 and 
2012, revenue from these sales has increased significantly17.  
 
A certain number of reforms are being implemented along two main lines. The first involves 
separating the production units from the transmission and storage activities within each 
Gazprom subsidiary. The second reform involves separating the company’s core business 
from its non-core activities by operating them as separate entities (Victor 2008). This 
separation of Gazprom’s activities into different companies is a prerequisite for implementing 
TPA provided for under Russian law and for greater transparency with respect to transmission 
costs. It is important to note the company’s efforts to be more transparent with regard to its 
financial affairs. In particular, it publishes its accounts regularly in compliance with 
international standards. 
 
- Disadvantages and advantages of an incumbent operator in a competitive 
environment 
                                                          
15
 In particular, the problem of the agent “turning against” its main shareholder. 
 
16 In their study, B. Nemtsov and V. Milov (2008) highlight the rise in Gazprom’s workforce. For the period 
2003-2007 in particular, the number of employees rose from 391,000 to 445,000. During the same period, 
production increased by only 15 Gm3, from 533 to 548 Gm3. 
 
17
 Gas volumes sold by Gazprom on its domestic market fell from 292 Gm3 in 2008 to 266 Gm3 in 2012, while 
revenues for these sales for this same period increased from 479 billion roubles to 800 billion roubles. Gazprom 
(2013). Gas for the future. Gazprom Investor Day. London, February. 
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A certain number of factors may put Gazprom at a disadvantage as it attempts to compete 
with new players in the industry. First of all, Gazprom is likely to see its production costs rise 
steeply. It is not easy to obtain information about these costs. But an analysis of the location 
of reserves for each player suggests that production costs for new market entrants might be 
competitive with those of Gazprom, whose costs are destined to rise significantly as it 
becomes obliged to focus on gas reserves in the Yamal and eastern Siberia. These two areas 
could account for 20% of Gazprom’s output by 2020 and for more than 50% by 2030 (cf. 
Table 4). Another point is important concerning the costs of production. In the case of 
associated gas from fields owned by oil companies, profitability is related essentially to the oil 
that is extracted. These companies therefore may sell natural gas at lower prices compared to 
Gazprom’s sales.  
 
Table 4: Gazprom gas production outlook 
 
Gm3 Current Forecast 
 2010 2020 2030 base 
scenario 
2030 high case 
scenario 
Production from current fields 510 380 150 150 
New Nadym-Pur-Taz fields  45 110 110 
Yamal projects  100 250 290 
Eastern Siberia and Far East 
region  
 20 70 70 
Shtokman  0 45 70 
Total 510 545 625 690 
Source: “Russian and Chinese energy relationships heats up”. Gas Matters, April 2013 
 
Taxation conditions are also likely to impact competition. Differential tax rates (in particular 
the Mineral Extraction Tax18) for Gazprom and the other companies demonstrate the State’s 
desire to encourage the development of competition by imposing higher rates on the 
incumbent producer, which already has an advantage because of its dominant market position. 
The State can also discriminate between the various players by granting tax exemptions, more 
specifically for developments in frontier areas (offshore, Eastern Siberia …). Gazprom has 
thus far never benefited from tax exemptions for the Shtokman development, whereas the 
Yamal LNG projects have exemptions for a period of 12 years (or for output up to 250 Gm3)  
 
But a huge advantage for Gazprom in relation to its competitors is its dominant position on 
the Russian market, with output of close to 500 Gm3. Having inherited the gas fields 
developed during the Soviet era, Gazprom’s market power is indisputable. The company’s 
export monopoly also puts it at a considerable advantage in that it has access to foreign 
currency and the highly profitable markets of the EU. However, in exchange it has to finance 
export pipelines, and in particular the NordStream and SouthStream. It is also obliged to 
supply households with gas at preferential prices. 
 
2.3 Towards liberalisation of Russian gas exports? 
                                                          
18 For Gazprom, this tax was 509 roubles/1000 m3 in 2012 and is set to rise in 2013 to 622 roubles 
($20)/1000 m3. For independent producers, the tax was 251 roubles/1000 m3 in 2012 and should rise to 
402 roubles/1000 m3 in 2013. 
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Competition on the domestic market between Gazprom and other players in the gas sector is 
likely to spread to the export sector. Gazprom’s export monopoly is increasingly being called 
into question by the independents (mainly Novatek) and the oil companies (mainly Rosneft). 
The competition concerning the export markets that seems to be developing between the two 
State companies is a key factor for the reorganisation of the gas sector. 
 
Liberalisation of Russian gas exports is one of the most controversial and most difficult issues 
for the State. The terms of the debate are as follows. On the one hand, new players in this 
sector are seeking to monetise their gas resources. Since they cannot do this simply on the 
domestic market, given demand forecasts and their expected output, their aim is to gain access 
to export markets. On the other hand, the macroeconomic implications of such market 
opening are considerable. In fact it would most probably create a situation where Russian 
producers are competing among each other on export markets. D. Tarr (2010) shows that 
liberalisation of the export market would significantly erode Russia’s monopoly profits on gas 
exports, by contributing in particular to decreasing prices on European spot markets.  
 
The debate concerns more specifically LNG exports to Asia, since for the time being 
Gazprom’s exports of natural gas to Europe via pipeline do not seem to be challenged. Asia 
has become a vital element in Russia’s strategy to diversify its export markets in view of the 
uncertainties in the European gas market stemming in particular from reduced demand 
(economic crisis and climate policy). This long-term strategy had until recently concerned 
only Gazprom, but now three of the six main projects to export LNG to Asia are planned 
without the participation of Gazprom. These are Sakhalin I (ExxonMobil-Rosneft), Yamal-
LNG (Novatek-Total) and Pechora LNG overseen by TNK-BP (now Rosneft). In 
consequence a solution has to be found to the problem of Gazprom’s export monopoly. The 
solution envisaged in the case of the most advanced project, the one headed by Novatek-
Total, is for the company to export its LNG through Gazprom, to which it will make a small 
payment for the service. However, this solution would not seem to be satisfactory since the 
viability of LNG projects is dependent on direct access to export markets. In fact the 
international financing that is needed to finance the huge investments involved is conditional 
upon such direct access being available. It is the exports that guarantee the investments, as 
was the case with the Gazprom gas natural gas pipelines to Europe.  
 
Table 5: LNG projects in Russia 
 
Projects Main players Fields Capacity 
(Mt/yr) 
On line Target 
markets 
Shtokman Gazprom-Total Shtokman 7.5-15 Unknown Europe, USA 
Vladivostok Gazprom Sakhalin, 
Kamchatka, 
Yakutia, Irkutsk 
3 trains of 5 2018 Asia including 
Japan  
Yamal LNG Novatek-Total South Tambey 
field 
5 (may be 
tripled) 
2018 Europe and 
Asia 
Yamal Novatek-
Gazprom 
   Asia 
Far East region Rosneft-
ExxonMobil 
Sakhalin I 
Okhotsk Sea 
 Unknown Asia-Pacific 
Pechora LNG TNK-BP Nenets 
Autonomous 
District 
2.6  China 
Sources: “Russia pays high price for export prize”. Petroleum Economist, October 2012; “Poutine réfléchit à une 
levée du monopole d’export de Gazprom, qui accélère le projet GNL de Vladivostok”. Pétrostratégies, n° 1295, 
4 March 2013; “Russia reviews LNG export policy”. International Gas Report, n° 718; 25 Feb. 2013 
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Even if it is the State’s intention to treat exports via gas pipelines and exports of LNG 
differently, there will still be nothing to prevent competition between these two gas delivery 
methods. Such competition is already occurring on the Asian market. LNG projects will likely 
have to compete with the natural gas pipeline to China, which Gazprom has been negotiating 
for many years. Final agreement is being held up in particular by the issue of the price 
indexation formula to be included in the long-term contract, and seemingly also by issues 
concerning access to Russian hydrocarbon resources. China’s strategy is to secure its supply, 
at least in part, by investing in the development of fields in exporting countries. It succeeded 
in doing this in Iran and Turkmenistan, but thus far Gazprom has not been willing to allow 
Chinese companies to get involved in development of its gas fields. 
 
Such competition could also develop on the European market, even if most of the gas 
exported by Gazprom to this zone is protected by long-term contracts. Half of the LNG 
exported from the field developed by Novatek-Total would thus go to Europe19. As for 
exports planned by Rosneft, although Asia is their preferred destination, some could also end 
up on the European market (particularly on spot markets)20.  
 
*** 
 
The “Gazprom model” that resulted from the reform of the 1990s no longer seems suited to 
the changing market in Europe nor the new domestic gas market that is emerging in Russia. 
Gazprom, with its export and transmission monopoly, must adapt to the more competitive 
markets in which it operates, and more importantly must develop more flexible strategies 
concerning contracts. This applies both to its export market as well as at home. In fact, despite 
the dominant position of Gazprom, the Russian domestic market is undergoing profound 
restructuring. Because of the particular institutional and economic context of the country, this 
reorganisation is not taking place along the lines of the de-integrated model of the EU. It is 
focussed on developing competitive forms and in particular between the two State companies, 
Gazprom and Rosneft. These changes will not be without consequence on the country’s 
export strategy. An increasingly profitable domestic market will open the way for greater 
flexibility, more specifically in Gazprom’s export strategies. But most importantly, 
Gazprom’s export monopoly could well become threatened. The implications for Russia and 
for international markets would be considerable. 
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